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A CURE FROM ROME FOR MONTREAL’S ILLNESS:
ARTICLE 5 OF THE ROME I REGULATION AND FILLING
THE VOID IN THE 1999 MONTREAL CONVENTION’S




An examination of the 1999 Montreal Convention shows that
the drafters did not intend to lay down a comprehensive treaty
that would organize a carrier’s liability for personal injury to pas-
sengers. They opted to achieve a certain level of uniformity
through enacting a set of rules that tackled several key issues
such as the grounds for a carrier’s liability, the available de-
fenses, and the limits on the recoverable damages. Conse-
quently, some unaddressed issues created a void in the Montreal
Convention and were then left without a clear remedy. In this
article, a distinction is made between two types of voids: first, the
definitional void describes the lack of definition for several key
terms used in the Montreal Convention, such as “accident” and
“carrier.” Second, the regulatory void describes the lack of rules
to address issues such as determining the effect of a passenger’s
contributory negligence as a defense for liability and the right of
action. This article demonstrates that national courts have re-
sorted either to the forum’s law or the forum’s choice-of-law
rules to fill the void in the Montreal Convention. As a result,
international uniformity of results cannot be achieved nor is
there any predictability. This article recommends the adoption
of Article 5 of the Rome I Regulation as a solution to this prob-
lem. Doing so would give both parties the freedom to choose a
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law, form a predetermined list, and fill the above mentioned
voids, while providing alternative choice-of-law rules if the par-
ties decided not to choose a law to govern their contract for air
carriage.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE DRAFTERS OF THE MONTREAL CONVENTION de-cided to focus their attention on uniting some aspects of the
Air Carrier’s liability under the contract of international air car-
riage without including a mechanism to ensure the uniform and
consistent interpretation and application of the Convention’s
text.1 This situation has created two types of voids: the first type
is the “definitional void” because the drafters left several key
concepts such as carrier and accident undefined.2 As the author
will demonstrate in this article, the courts in various jurisdic-
tions need to develop their own definitions of those key terms to
enable them to apply the Montreal Convention, or else the same
term is given different meanings rendering uniform application
of the Convention impossible. The second type of void is the
“regulatory void,” which describes the lack of substantive rules
addressing issues such as the effect of a passenger’s contributory
negligence as a defense for liability and a carrier’s duty of care
under the contract of carriage. Thus, courts have resorted to
either using their own laws or their choice-of-law rules. As the
author will demonstrate, neither solution is capable of produc-
ing uniform results. Finally, the author will suggest using Article
5 of the Rome I Regulation as a choice-of-law rule to fill the void
in the Montreal Convention in a uniform and predictable man-
ner because it allows carriers and passengers to choose a law
from a limited set of options to govern their contracts while pro-
viding alternatives if such choice was absent. Therefore, this arti-
cle will be divided into two parts. Part Two will explore both
types of voids. Part Three will explore the use of both forum law
and forum choice-of-law rules as a cure for the void, ending in
the final suggestion of the use of Article 5 of the Rome I Regula-
tion to fill the void.
1 Marc McDonald, The Montreal Convention and the Preemption of Air Passenger
Harm Claims, 44 IRISH JURIST (N.S.) 203, 231 (2010).
2 Tracy Bussel, Airline Injuries: When Is Liability Imposed, 2002 INT’L TRAVEL L.J.
87, 88–89 (2002).
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II. EXPLORING THE VOID
In this part, the article will explore both types of voids within
the Montreal Convention, starting with the definitional void fol-
lowed by the regulatory void. The distinction between the two
types of voids is important because the definitional void affects
the Montreal Convention’s scope of application. According to
Article 17 Section 1, “The carrier is liable for damage sustained
in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition
only that the accident which caused the death or injury took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking.”3 Therefore, if multiple
definitions are used for what constitutes an “accident” as a con-
dition precedent for applying the Montreal Convention, then
the Convention’s scope of application will not be uniform and
will vary from one jurisdiction to another.
On the other hand, the regulatory void touches upon the ex-
clusivity of the Montreal Convention rules that govern a carrier’s
liability. Whenever a court does not find a rule to address an
issue, such as the effects of a passenger’s contributory negli-
gence within the Montreal Convention, it will resort to either its
own national law or its own choice-of-law rules. This means that
the Montreal Convention will not enjoy the exclusivity status re-
quired to attain the Convention’s purpose of unifying the rules
governing the air carrier’s liability.
A. DEFINITIONAL VOID
As stated earlier, the carrier’s liability for a passenger injury or
death is determined by Article 17.4 However, due to the lack of
definitions provided by the text of the Montreal Convention, na-
tional courts defined this liability according to their own na-
tional concepts or by using choice-of-law terminology. These
techniques are used in the 1929 Warsaw Convention as well.5
This led to a lack of uniformity in holdings because the same
concept may have various meanings. This is especially problem-
atic with the terms carrier and accident.
3 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, art. 17 sec. 1, May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
4 Id.
5 Law No. 131 of 1948 (Civil Code), al-Jarı¯dah al-Rasmı¯yah, 29 July 1948, § 10
(Egypt) [hereinafter the Egyptian Civil Code]; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Specific Prin-
ciples of Private Transnational Law, 121 RECUEIL DES COURS 235 (1968); HENRI BA-
TIFOL & PAUL LAGARDE, TRAITE´ DE DROIT INT’L PRIVE´ 478 (8th ed.1993).
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1. Carrier
Although the Montreal Convention is all about regulating air
transport, it does not even define “carrier,”6 unlike EU regula-
tion No. 889/2002, which defines an air carrier as “air transport
undertaking with a valid operating license.”7 Thus, each state is
free to develop its own definition of the word carrier without
consideration for uniformity of results and holdings. For in-
stance, the Singaporean courts have ruled that, under the War-
saw Convention (which also does not contain a definition), the
term carrier does not include any party undertaking the carriage
of goods besides the actual or contractual carrier.8 Therefore,
freight forwarders who conclude contracts of aerial carriage, ei-
ther as a principal or as an agent, are not carriers according to
the Singaporean definition of the word carrier used in the War-
saw Convention.9 On the other hand, a Japanese court ruled
that the word carrier under the Warsaw Convention meant ex-
clusively a contracting party unless the circumstances of the case
indicate that both the actual and contracting carrier are en-
gaged in performing a single operation.10
In France, the courts use a more elaborated approach to de-
fine the concept of carrier which requires the examination of
the nature of the operations carried out under the contract.
There, a carrier is a party engaged solely in an activity qualified
as “transport,” which is the physical displacement of a person or
thing.11 On the other hand, a party whose activity is qualified as
a “voyage,” which is a mixture of transportation and activities, or
as forfait touristique, which adds accommodation to the mix, will
not be considered a carrier. As a result, the law of the jurisdic-
tion where the activity took place, and not the Montreal Conven-
tion, will be applicable to the merits of the case.12
Similarly, the lack of a definition of a carrier’s “agents” or
“servants” also causes each court to use its own definitions. In
6 Berhard A. Koch, Other Strict Liabilities, TORT L. OF THE EUR. COMM. 135, 1135
(Helmut Koziol & Reiner Schulze eds. 2008).
7 2002 O.J. (L140) 2, 3.
8 Leng Sun Chan, Claims Arising from Air Carriage, 12 SING. ACAD. L.J. 331, 335
(2000).
9 Id.
10 Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] October 13, 1999, (wa) no. 11629,
5 UNIFORM LAW REVIEW [UNIF. L. REV.] 354, 366, 368 (Japan).
11 Olivier Cachard, Le Transport International Ae´rien de Passenger, 373 RECUEIL
DES COURS 23 (2015).
12 Id.
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the United States, there are two different tests for determining
whether a person qualifies as an agent or a contractor. The first
is the furtherance test, which classifies a person as an agent or
contractor based on how far removed that person’s activity is
from the execution of the contract of carriage.13 Thus, a com-
pany contracted to clean airplanes was found to be an agent of
the carrier under the Warsaw Convention.14 The test is also ap-
plied to determine agents under the Montreal Convention.
Thus, a terminal operator is an agent for the air carrier because
its operations are a vital part of executing the contract of trans-
portation.15 The second test, also developed when interpreting
the Warsaw Convention, is the required services test, whereby a
person is an agent or servant if his services were required by the
airline according to the forum’s law.16 For example, if a law re-
quires that the airlines be responsible for conducting security
inspections, then the airlines will be liable for the actions of
those who conduct that activity, even if those who made the ac-
tual inspection are merely the employees of a contractor. On
the other hand, if the law requires the security inspection to be
conducted by law enforcement agencies or some other third
party, then the airline will not be liable for actions of its
employees.
Under Egyptian law, the distinction between servants and
agents as ancillaries depends on their functions during the per-
formance of the contract of carriage. On one hand, an agent is a
person who concludes legal transactions in the name of and on
behalf of his principal in accordance with the terms of the con-
tract of agency and the former’s instructions.17 Therefore, the
principal carrier is liable only for the agent’s actions that are
associated with executing his duties as an agent, concluding con-
tracts on his behalf. A carrier will not be liable for the agent’s
action if it lies beyond the agent’s duties or are in breach of the
13 Julius Young Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Delta Air Lines, 414 N.Y.S. 2d 528, 528 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979).
14 Waxman v. C.I.S. Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A. De C.V., 13 F. Supp. 2d 508,
513–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
15 Vumbaca v. Terminal One Group Ass’n. L.P., 859 F. Supp. 2d 343, 364
(E.D.N.Y. 2012).
16 In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 776 F. Supp. 710,
714 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Kabbani v. Int’l Total Servs., 805 F. Supp. 1033, 1039–40
(D.D.C. 1992).
17 Civil Code, art. 699 (Egypt) (“Agency is a contract whereby an agent binds
himself to perform a juridical act on behalf of a principal.”).
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principal’s instructions.18 On the other hand, the servant is a
subordinate employee of the carrier. Subordination means that
the carrier supervises the servant’s performance of his duties,
determines those duties, and the hours of work.19 Therefore,
the airplane’s crew and the carrier’s ground-handling personnel
are servants. The carrier is not liable for the servant’s actions
unless the conduct took place while the servant was performing
his duties.20
2. Accident
It is important to remember that the purpose of the Montreal
Convention, as with the Warsaw Convention, is to define carrier
liability for the bodily injury of the passenger on a basis that is
different from the res ipsa loquitur concept.21 The carrier’s liabil-
ity does not arise by the mere occurrence of the passenger’s
death or injury. The carrier is liable only when the death or
physical bodily injury is the direct result of an accident that oc-
curred while the passengers were onboard the airplane and dur-
ing the time between embarkation and disembarkation.
Fortunately, most jurisdictions agree that the phrase “bodily in-
jury” in Article 17 of the Montreal Convention is a continuation
of “injury” in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, a
passenger’s right to recovery is limited to physical injuries.22
This means that injuries resulting from a passenger’s medical
condition, such as cardiac arrest23 or other individual physiolog-
ical events,24 do not qualify as a “bodily injury” and a carrier thus
18 Civil Code, art. 703 (Egypt) (“The Agent is bound to perform the agency
without exceeding the limits fixed therein.”).
19 Civil Code, art. 671 (Egypt) (“A contract of employment is one whereby one
of the contracting parties undertakes to work in the service and under the super-
vision of the other contracting party in consideration of a remuneration which
such other party undertakes to pay.”).
20 Civil Code, art. 174 (Egypt) (“A Master is liable for the damage caused by an
unlawful act of his servant when the act was performed by the servant in the
course, or as a result, of his employment.”).
21 Malgorzata Polkowska, Some Observations on Civil Air Carrier Liability in Inter-
national Air Carriage – “Accident”, “Damage” and Jurisdiction, 15 UNIF. L. REV. 109,
111 (2010); compare with John Fenston, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation, 1 MCGILL L.J.
209, 229–210 (1953).
22 E. Airlines, Inc., v. Floyd , 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991).
23 Jennifer A. George, Sudden Cardiac Arrest and Airline Liability, 1999 INT’L
TRAVEL L.J. 178, 185 (1999).
24 Mu .hmad Mu¯sa´ Muhmad, Fa¯krt Al-kh.ta¯ Fy Itifaqyt “Farsfya” wa Ms’lyt Al-na¯ql
Al-Jwi Fy Al-naql Al-Jwi 214 (1986).
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cannot be held liable for those occurrences.25 However, the
Montreal and Warsaw Conventions do not define accident as an
injury-producing event. There was an attempt to limit the defini-
tion of accident in a draft of the Warsaw Convention. The draft
limited the term “accident” to incidents related to pilot error,
equipment malfunction, or natural disaster. However, this defi-
nition was abandoned in the final version26 and no effort was
made to introduce one in 1999 when the Montreal Convention
was passed.
Most jurisdictions agree that the word “accident” in both Con-
ventions refers to the cause of the death or injury as distinct
from the death or injury itself.27 In other words, courts should
focus their attention on the event that caused the passenger’s
death or injury to see if that event qualifies as an accident. This
is crucial because it serves as a condition precedent for holding
the carrier liable for damages to the passenger. Under the War-
saw Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court in Air France v. Saks
defined accident as an “unexpected or unusual event or hap-
pening that is external to the passenger.”28 This means that cer-
tain incidents, such as loss of hearing, do not constitute an
accident, despite being an unpleasant event, since they are not
uncommon occurrences during air travel.29 Important examples
of accidents include plane hijackings and terrorist attacks.30 As a
result, all federal courts across the United States apply Saks’s def-
inition of “accident” to the Montreal Convention.31
In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords refused to recog-
nize as an accident a passenger’s injury from deep vein throm-
bosis caused by sitting onboard an airplane seat for an extended
period.32 The High Court of Australia, similarly, decided that
the word “accident” evokes the elements of mishap or misadven-
ture, however produced, and is wide enough to include any kind
25 Air France v. Mme X., Cour D’ Appel De Toulouse, 275 Revue Franc¸aise de
Droit Aerial et Spatial 327, 329 (2015).
26 Bussel, supra note 2, at 89.
27 Povey v. Qantas Airways (2005) 223 CLR 189, 204 (Austl.).
28 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
29 Id. at 406.
30 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 707 (1972); Roberta L.
Wilensky, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The Liability of Airlines under the Warsaw Conven-
tion for Injuries Due to Terrorism, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 249, 271 (1987).
31 Arellano v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2014);
Siddiq v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., No. 6:11-cv-69-Orl-19GJK, 2013 WL
2152566, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2013).
32 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Group Litigation, [2006] 1 A.C. 495, 527.
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of misfortunate or undesirable circumstances or condition or
combination thereof and ultimately also found that deep vein
thrombosis did not qualify as an accident under the Warsaw
Convention.33 In France, courts define accident under the Mon-
treal Convention as a material incident that was provoked inclu-
sively by an external event which is unexpected, sudden, and
inflicted involuntarily upon the victim.34 Thus, incidents like
loss of hearing or dizziness, which are usual or expected inci-
dents of air travel, do not qualify as an accident under the Mon-
treal Convention.35 Even falling on the tarmac before boarding
an airplane is not considered an accident.36
However, a careful examination of the above definitions
reveals that each do not provide any informative criterion to de-
termine when a given event is considered an accident. The use
of terms like “unusual,” “unexpected,” and “sudden” does not
define the unusualness, unexpectedness, or suddenness of an
incident in order to be qualified as an accident under either the
Warsaw Convention or the Montreal Convention.37 In fact, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Saks expressly stated that its own defini-
tion of accident “should be flexibly applied after assessment of
all the circumstances surrounding a passenger’s injuries.”38
Therefore, courts still have a large latitude for when a given
event constitutes an “accident” and can base judgment on the
circumstances of the case, even when the injury might not be
flight related. For example, in Olympic Airways v. Husain,39 the
respondent’s husband presented to an airline check-in agent a
physician’s letter that explained how he had a medical history of
recurrent anaphylactic reactions and should be seated in a non-
smoking area of the plane.40 During his flight from Athens to
San Francisco, he found himself seated three rows away from
the smoking section of the flight, which prompted him to ask
the flight attendant if he could be seated away from the smoking
33 Povey v. Qantas Airways (2005) 223 CLR 189, 205 (Austl.).
34 Air France c/ Mme X., Cour D’Appel De Toulouse (2015) 275 Revue Fran-
c¸aise De Droit Ae`rien et Spatial 327, 329 (2015).
35 Id.
36 La Socie`te` Aigle c/ Lex E¨poux Y, Arreˆt no 11 du 15 January 2014 (11-
27.962) Cour De Cassation-Premie`re Chambre Civile.
37 Alexa West, Defining “Accidents” in the Air: Why Tort Law Principles are Essential
to Interpret the Montreal Convention’s “Accident” Requirement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
1465, 1479 (2016).
38 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
39 540 U.S. 644 (2004).
40 Id. at 647.
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section, but his request was not answered.41 He suffered from an
anaphylactic reaction from inhaling secondhand smoking and
died onboard.42
The carrier argued that the death was not an accident under
Warsaw Convention for two reasons: First, the carrier asserted
that the passenger’s death was due to an internal reaction
(asthma), not an external event.43 Second, the carrier asserted
that the flight attendant’s refusal to change the passenger’s seat
further away from the smoking section was an inaction, whereas
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention requires an accident to be
the result of an action that causes the injury.44 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court said that “the injury producing event,” the acci-
dent, is not a “precise factual event” but is often a group of
“multiple interrelated factual events that combine to cause any
given injury.”45 In other words, an accident is not a single fact
but a grouping of several events that together cause the injury,
which was in this case: (1) the passenger’s medical history; (2)
the passenger’ close to the smoking section; (3) the exposure to
the secondhand smoke; and (4) the flight attendant’s refusal to
reseat the passenger away from the smoking section in violation
of the airliner’s policy and instructions.46 Furthermore, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the flight attendant’s inaction, her re-
fusal to assist the passenger, was in fact an unusual event or hap-
pening that constitutes an “accident” under the Warsaw
Convention.47 In this case, at least in the United States, the con-
cept of an accident no longer reflects an event but a description
of a set of circumstances surrounding the passenger when the
injury occurred.
This broad, fact-sensitive approach to defining “accident” ulti-
mately allows courts to hold a carrier liable for events that are
not even specific to the operation of air transport, such as the
acts of co-passengers. In Wallace v. Korean Air, a South Korean
passenger sexually molested his co-passenger-plaintiff who fell
asleep during a flight from the United States to South Korea.48
41 Id.
42 Id. at 648.
43 Id. at 652.
44 Id.
45 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 653 (2004).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 654–55.
48 Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 2000).
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The United States Second Circuit decided that the carrier was
ultimately liable for this injury because
[t]he characteristics of air travel increased [her] vulnerability to
[the] assault . . . she was cramped into a confined space beside
two men she did not know, one of whom turned out to be a sex-
ual predator. The lights were turned down and the sexual
predator was left unsupervised in the dark. It was then that the
attack occurred.49
The court pointed to the assailant’s ability to unbutton the
plaintiff’s belt, unzip her shorts, and squeeze his hands into her
shorts, all without being checked by any of the flight crew, as
important factors in characterizing the sexual assault as an “acci-
dent” under the Warsaw Convention.50 In short, the definition
of what constitutes an accident under both the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the Montreal Convention will depend on a court’s eval-
uation of the circumstances surrounding the passenger’s death
or injury instead of a predetermined criterion, which creates un-
certainty and renders the predictability of the case outcome
near impossible.
Another thorny issue caused by the definitional void is the
issue of what constitutes “embarking” and “disembarking,” since
a carrier’s liability for a passenger’s death or bodily injury com-
mences with embarking and ceases upon disembarking. This ar-
ticle will focus on two approaches. The first approach, adopted
by the French courts, focuses on the time when the contract of
air transport starts to run rather than on defining embarking
and disembarking.51 In other words, the French approach holds
a carrier liable for a passenger’s bodily injury as long as the in-
jury occurred during the execution of the contract of transport
and was associated with the risks of air transport.52 For example,
upon interpreting the Warsaw Convention, a French court ruled
that a carrier, Air France in this case, was liable for the injury of
a passenger who was pushed by the carrier’s airport bus while
proceeding from the air terminal toward his aircraft.53 There,
the contract had commenced because the passenger was on his
way to board the agreed-upon airplane and was then injured by
the airline. On the other hand, the French courts ruled that
49 Id. at 299.
50 Id. at 300.
51 Polkowska, supra note 21, at 112.
52 Hassan Kyrah, Ms’lyt Al-na¯ql Al-Jwi fy Itifaqyt “Farsfya” wa Brutwkwl Lahly Al-
Mu¯dl Lha 28 (1959).
53 Polkowska, supra note 21, at 112.
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hijacking and terrorist attacks do not constitute accidents under
the Warsaw Convention because they are not related to the risks
of air carriage.54
A different approach is used by U.S. courts, which was laid out
in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.55 The court developed a tripar-
tite test whereby the determination of embarking and dis-
embarking is made according to “the passengers’ activity . . . to
the restriction of their movements, to the imminence of board-
ing, or even to their position adjacent to the terminal gate
. . . .”56 The court held that a terrorist attack that took place
inside the terminal constituted an accident that occurred during
embarkment.57 The same conclusion was reached in Evangelinos
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. where a group of passengers were
shot by terrorists while standing in a queue at the transit hall
prior to boarding the airplane at Athens International Airport.58
Courts across the United States use the Day tripartite test to de-
termine what constitutes embarking and disembarking under
the Montreal Convention.59
Nonetheless, the Day tripartite test does not produce predict-
able results because it is based on a circumstantial approach,
much like the test that U.S. courts use to define “accidents.” In
Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, the court held that a terrorist
attack on passengers in a baggage claim was not an accident for
three main reasons. First, the passengers had already emerged
from the aircraft and presented their passports to the customs
authorities. Second, the passengers were about half a mile away
from the airplane that they deplaned. Third, the passengers’
movements were no longer restricted or monitored by the air-
line personnel.60 In a different case, preventing a passenger
from boarding an airplane was held to constitute an accident
54 Mamdouh Ali Alhoudaili, Air Carrier Liability – Unfinished Unification of
Private International Air Law 80 (May, 2005) (Unpublished LL.M thesis, McGill
University) (on file with ProQuest Dissertation & Thesis Global Database).
55 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
56 Id. at 33.
57 Id.
58 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 156 (1977).
59 See Kruger v. Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd., 976 F. Supp. 2d 290, 303 (E.D.N.Y.
2013), aff’d, 578 F. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2014); Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760
F.3d 1165, 1173 (11th Cir. 2014); Adelson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. C 17-00548
WHA, 2017 WL 2265459, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2017); Sanches-Naek v. TAP
Portugal, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 3d 185, 194 (D. Conn. 2017); David v. United Air-
lines, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-02262-ODW (PJWx), 2016 WL 1573423, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 18, 2016).
60 Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 282–85 (1st Cir. 1976).
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while embarking under the Montreal Convention because
boarding an airplane is an activity related to air travel.61 In an-
other reported case, the court decided that an injury sustained
by a passenger while moving from one concourse to another to
catch a connecting flight, at his own pace and speed, did not
qualify as an accident under the Warsaw Convention.62 Finally,
in Hong Kong, a district court adopted the Day tripartite test
and found that the fall of an unaccompanied minor while stand-
ing in a queue at the immigration checkpoint qualified as an
accident under the Warsaw Convention.63 So, if a terrorist attack
or natural catastrophe destroyed an entire airport, there will be
exactly two groups of passengers: The first group is covered by
the Montreal Convention because they were at the airport either
standing in a queue at the airline’s check in counter or at the
immigration checkpoint. The second group is not covered by
the Montreal Convention because they are claiming their lug-
gage or waiting for their connecting flight in the airport’s
lounge.
As a result, using a forum’s own substantive law to define key
terms like “accident” under the both the Warsaw Convention
and the Montreal Convention creates unpredictable and incon-
sistent results that vary from one court to another and one coun-
try to another. Each court will apply its own notions to
supplement the definitional void in the Convention. In fact, as
seen, the definitional void enables some courts to define the
word “accident” in such a generous and expansive manner that
passengers in those jurisdictions could receive damages for ter-
rorist attacks while passengers in other countries may not. Thus,
a plaintiff’s ability to recover damages from the carrier under
the Montreal Convention may depend on the court’s definition
of what constitutes an accident rather than the actual nature of
their injuries.
B. THE REGULATORY VOID
The regulatory void refers to the lack of sufficient detailed
rules within the text of the Montreal Convention, which ulti-
mately prevents it from being the exclusive source of rules regu-
lating a carrier’s liability under the contract of air carriage. The
61 Okeke v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. 1:07CV538, 2010 WL 780167, at *5
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 26, 2010).
62 Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp. 441, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
63 Ong v. Malaysian Airlines Sys. Bhd, [2007] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 255, 260 (H.K.).
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article here will examine the Montreal Convention’s actual
scheme for establishing the carrier’s liability for the death and
injury of the passenger. According to Article 21(1) of the Mon-
treal Convention, “[f]or damages arising under paragraph 1 of
Article 17 not exceeding 100,000 Special Drawing Rights for
each passenger, the carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit
its liability.”64 This article represents a shift from a presumed
fault-based liability (which prevailed under the Warsaw Conven-
tion) to strict liability.65 Thus, an injured passenger, or his estate
in the case of death, is required to prove only the existence of
an injury or death to hold the carrier liable—there is no need to
prove negligence or any other sort of fault.66 In other words, a
carrier’s duty under the contract of air transport is now a duty of
success rather than a duty of best efforts.67
The second tier of liability under the Montreal Convention is
for damages exceeding 100,000 Special Drawing Units (SDR).
Unlike the first tier of liability, the basis of the second tier is the
presumed fault of the carrier. In other words, the second tier of
liability relies on the rebuttable presumption that the carrier’s
actions, or the actions of its agents or servants, are the cause of
the injury or death. As a result, the carrier can absolve itself
from liability through several defenses. First, a carrier can use a
“no negligence defense,” or that the injury was not caused by its
actions or the actions of its servants or agents. Second, a carrier
can show that the action of a third party was the sole cause of
the injury. Third, the carrier can use the “contributory negli-
gence” defense under Article 20 of the Montreal Convention.68
Nonetheless, the liability scheme under the Montreal Conven-
tion suffers from a regulatory void because it does not provide
the world with a comprehensive set of rules, specifically a set of
uniform choice-of-law rules to address all the various aspects of
air transport. For example, just like the Warsaw Convention, it
does not contain a substantive rule or a choice-of-law rule that
addresses how a court should calculate passenger damages due
or who exactly could have standing to sue in the first place.69
Furthermore, the contributory negligence defense, which was
64 Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art. 21 sec. 1.
65 Cachard, supra note 11, at 135.
66 Kyrah, supra note 52, at 14.
67 Mu .hmad Farid Al-’ryynı¯, Al-Qanu¯n Al-Jwı¯, 348 (2009).
68 Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art. 20.
69 Ludovico M. Bentivoglio, Conflict Problems in Air Law, 119 RECUEIL DES COURS
128 (1966); Troy A. Weigand, The Modernization of the Warsaw Convention and the
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left to the forum’s law to regulate under the Warsaw Conven-
tion,70 is left without indication of what constitutes contributory
negligence and without a choice-of-law rule under the Montreal
Convention.71 Therefore, a court finds itself before two solu-
tions to supplement the lackluster rules contained in the Mon-
treal Convention, as it did under the Warsaw Convention: either
apply its own law72 or use its own choice-of-law rules to direct
itself to the national law that will be used to fill the gaps, as seen
later on.
This state of affairs has an adverse effect on the exclusiveness
of the Montreal Convention’s rules within the national legal sys-
tems. It is true that there are jurisdictions, including Canada,73
Australia,74 and Hong Kong,75 that mandate their courts to ap-
ply the Montreal Convention’s rules without reference to any
other rules. In those jurisdictions, a passenger’s claim against a
carrier must fulfill the requirements under the Montreal Con-
vention and is limited to the remedies set out in such. Failure to
do so will mean that the lawsuit against the carrier will be dis-
missed. Thus, a passenger would have no remedy under the law
of that forum if the Montreal Convention does not recognize
the claim.76 Nonetheless, that ignores the fact that there is a
void within the Montreal Convention, which means that its rules
alone cannot provide a complete framework for the passenger’s
claim against the carrier.
New Liability Scheme for Claims Arising Out of International Flight, 84 MASS L. REV.
175, 179 (2008).
70 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage art. 21, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
“If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the
negligence of the injured person the Court may, in accordance with the provi-
sions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability.” Id.
71 Jennifer Mckay, The Refinement of the Warsaw System: Why the 1999 Montreal
Convention Represents the Best Hope for Uniformity, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 73, 93
(2002).
72 Laurent Chassot, L’article 29 De La Convention Du Montre´al, Clef de Vouˆte
de la Responsabilite´ du Transporteur Ae´rien International 19 (August 2009)
(Unpublished LL.M thesis, McGill University) (on file with ProQuest Dissertation
& Thesis Global Database).
73 Thibodeau v. Air Canada [2014] S.C.R. 340, 343.
74 Kern v Qantas Airways Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1565 (Austl.); Povey v Qantas Air-
ways Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 189, 203 (Austl.).
75 Olding v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., [2003] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 476, 479; Ericsson
Ltd. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, [2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 584, 593 (H.K.).
76 Andreas Kadletz, American Court’s New Drive Towards Uniformity in Interna-
tional Air Transport Law: A Survey of Recent U.S. and Canadian Jurisprudence and the
Political Background, 49 GERMAN J. AIR & SPACE L. 201, 203 (2000).
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Several forums that tend to treat the Warsaw Convention as a
nonexclusive source of rules on carrier liability already acknowl-
edge this fact. For example, the Singaporean courts have ap-
plied the Warsaw Convention alongside Singaporean law, since
the Warsaw Convention trumps its common law causes of action
but does not trump the equitable defenses that are related to
the principles of equity, “which are a fundamental part of the
law of Singapore.”77 Thus, the Convention repeals the common
law remedies but does not bar courts from having to resort to
equitable remedies. Egypt adopts a similar approach. According
to Article 3 of the Egyptian Civil Aviation Law, the Montreal
Convention trumps Egyptian law in any topic that the Montreal
Convention addresses.78 Similarly, the Egyptian Cassation Court
has ruled that Egyptian law would govern legal issues not cov-
ered by the Warsaw Convention.79
A prime example of how the regulatory void undermines both
the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention’s exclu-
siveness can be found in the United States. The courts there are
struggling to convince themselves that both Conventions could
completely preempt the law of the forum on legal issues not ad-
dressed by either Convention.80 To illustrate, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Zicherman v. Korean Airlines ruled that a mother and
sister of a deceased passenger could seek damages for the loss of
the deceased’s society and companionship, looking to a federal
law—the Death on the High Seas Act—which was not recog-
nized under the Warsaw Convention.81 Under an exclusive ap-
proach, the Court should have dismissed the case because loss
of a deceased’s society and companionship is not compensable
under the Warsaw Convention. However, the Court accepted
the claim for damages because “[t]he Warsaw convention per-
mit[s] compensation only for legally cognizable harm, but
leave[s] the specification of what harm is legally cognizable to
the domestic law applicable under the forum’s choice-of-law
77 Chan, supra note 8, at 334.
78 Law No. 28 of 1981 (Civil Aviation Law of Arab Republic of Egypt), al-Jarı¯dah
al-Rasmı¯yah, vol. 17, 23 April 1981, art. 3 (Egypt). “The provisions of the interna-
tional and regional Civil Aviation treaties and conventions which State is a party
thereto, as well as the provisions of this law, shall be applied, without prejudice to
the provisions of such treaties and conventions.” Id.
79 Ma .hkamat al-Naq .d [Court of Cassation], no. 908/49 (Egypt).
80 Benjamin v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1316 (S.D. Ga. 2014);
Sompo Japan Ins. Inc., v. Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir.
2008); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 661, 667 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
81 Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 516 U.S. 217, 231 (1996).
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rules.”82 The Court found that the Warsaw Convention did not
ban recovery for loss of a deceased’s society and companionship
and decided that the issue should be addressed by the Death on
the High Sea Act, which was the applicable body of law in de-
fault to the Warsaw Convention’s rules, and allowed the peti-
tioners to claim damages for loss of society.83 Fortunately, the
U.S Supreme Court had an opportunity to rectify this holding in
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, in which the Court
held that “the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from
maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local
law when her claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability
under the Convention.”84 However, the U.S Supreme Court did
not go further to ensure the exclusivity of the Warsaw Conven-
tion and adopted the “‘reverse-Erie’ doctrine” to ban the plain-
tiff from using state law in his claims under the Warsaw
Convention, and by the same analogy under the Montreal Con-
vention, as it did under Maritime law.85
In fact, the U.S Supreme Court’s hesitation allowed the lower
federal courts to try to avoid granting the Montreal Convention
provisions the status of complete preemption by claiming that
Article 29 does not require such a result. As one lower court
stated:
[w]hile one can theorize as to the intent informing the retooled
Article 29 (formerly Article 24), the plain meaning of the result-
ing text militates against finding complete preemption. The pro-
vision’s language ‘whether under this Convention or in contract
or in tort or otherwise’ expressly contemplates the application of
the Convention’s limits to all types of cases within its scope—
whether directly brought under the Convention or under state/
local tort or contract law.86
This argument does have its own merits, for the language used
in drafting Article 29 does not clearly prevent the plaintiff from
resorting to local law in his claim.87 However, this skepticism
stems from the fact that those courts realize that the regulatory
82 Id.
83 Id. at 231–32.
84 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999).
85 Luis F. Ras, Warsaw’s Wingspan Over State Laws: Towards a Streamlined System of
Recovery, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 587, 612 (1994).
86 DeJoseph v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 595, 603 (D. N.J. 2014).
87 Chassot, supra note 72, at 41; compare with Protocol to Amend the Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, Oct. 12, 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague art. IX, Sept.
28, 1955, art. IX, 10 I.L.M. 613.
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void within the Montreal Convention prevents the latter from
being a comprehensive regulation of the carrier’s liability and
that resorting to the forum’s law or the forum’s choice-of-law is
inevitable as discussed earlier.
III. THE SEARCH FOR A CURE FOR THE VOID
As demonstrated, there are two solutions left for filling the
regulatory void. The first solution is to apply the law of the fo-
rum directly as a supplement to the Montreal Convention’s
rule.88 The second solution is to use the forum’s choice-of-law
rules to furnish the rules to fill the regulatory void within the
Montreal Convention.89 In the latter case though, some jurisdic-
tions use their torts choice-of-law rule while others use their con-
tracts choice-of-law rule. This article will now explore both
solutions.
A. THE LAW OF THE FORUM
Applying the law of the forum does not serve the purpose of
establishing uniform rules because the outcome will vary de-
pending on where the lawsuit is filed, which creates the risk of
forum shopping. Consider the measurement of damages. Since
the Montreal Convention’s liability scheme is divided into two
tiers depending on the monetary value of the damages sought,
and since the Montreal Convention did not specify a rule for
assessing the monetary value of the damages, it is left for each
court to decide. Courts in the United Kingdom and Canada cal-
culate a passenger’s damages in the same manner as damages
Article 24 of the Convention shall be deleted and replaced by the
following: “. . . 1. In the carriage of cargo, any action for damages,
however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions
and limits set out in this Convention. 2. In the carriage of passen-
gers and baggage any action for damages, however founded,
whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or other-
wise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits of
liability set out in this Convention without prejudice to the ques-
tion as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and
what are their respective rights. Such limits of liability constitute
maximum limits and may not be exceeded whatever the circum-
stances which gave rise to the liability.”
Id.
88 Cachard, supra note 11, at 145.
89 Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 228–29 (1996); Ntorina
Antoni, Conflict of Tort Laws in International Air Accidents: Evolution of Lex Fori and
Lex Loci Delicti in the E.U. and U.S., 2 AVIATION & SPACE J. 2, 4 (2015).
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resulting from a breach of contract.90 However, when Canadian
courts assess damages, they do not include funeral costs (if ap-
plicable) and they subtract the value of the passenger’s life in-
surance from the final sum of damages awarded to the
passenger’s heirs (once again, if applicable).91 In Hong Kong, a
court will not take into consideration the purely economic loss
resulting from the injury.92 This is in contrast to Egyptian courts,
and most other civil law jurisdictions, which will take into con-
sideration such economic loss as a part of the lucrum cessans that
the passenger is entitled to receive from the carrier.93 Conse-
quently, the amount of damages received by passengers who suf-
fer from any bodily injury while flying will depend on which
forum hears their dispute. This is a result that does not by any
means coincide with the Convention’s aim of achieving
uniformity.
Another example is the contributory negligence defense
under Article 20 of the Montreal Convention. Each forum has
its own definition of what constitutes contributory negligence
and the effect it has on the tortfeasor’s liability. Under French
and Egyptian law, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence does
not relieve a defendant from liability unless the plaintiff’s ac-
tions were inexcusable and were the exclusive cause of injury.94
Whereas under English common law, a plaintiff’s contributory
negligence reduces the amount of damages recoverable from a
defendant in proportion to its share in the injury.95 Some juris-
dictions have multiple rules on the issue because of their federal
structure, such as Australia96 and the United States.97 This
90 Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., [1937] 1 K.B. 50, 69; Vassallo v. Trans Can.
Airlines, 1963 Carswell Ont. 177 (1963).
91 Micheal D. Lipton & Vance Cooper, International Air Travel: An Air Carrier’s
Liability for Personal Injury, 5 ADVOC. Q. 403, 407 (1985).
92 Olding v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., [2003] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 476, 488.
93 John Y. Gotanda, Damages in Private International Law, 326 RECUEIL DES
COURS 106 (2007).
94 Danny Watson, Style over Substance? A Comparative Analysis of the English and
French Approaches to Fault in Establishing Tortious Liability, 2 MANCHESTER REV. L.
CRIME & ETHICS 1, 6 (2013); Ma .hkamat al-Naq .d [Court of Cassation], no. 36/26
(Egypt); Ma .hkamat al-Naq .d [Court of Cassation], no. 92/63 (Egypt); Ma .hkamat
al-Naq .d [Court of Cassation], no. 5202/62 (Egypt).
95 Nettleship v. Wetson [1971] RTR 425, 426.
96 Vernon Nase & Nick Hunphrey, Three Steps Forward, Two Steps Back: Reflections
on Air Carriers’ Liability and Australia’s Accession to Montreal 99, 55 GERMAN AIR &
SPACE L.J. 364, 372 (2006).
97 Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 550
(1996).
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means that the Montreal Convention has failed once again to
produce uniform results. The same problem exists when it
comes to determining the heirs of the deceased passenger. In
Canada, heirs will be determined according to a mandatory rule
contained in the Carriage by Air Act without resorting to a
choice-of-law rule.98 In Egypt, the heirs will be determined ac-
cording to the Islamic Shariah as embodied in the Egyptian law
if the deceased was an Egyptian.99
In addition, applying the law of the forum as a supplement to
the Montreal Convention’s rules might give the opportunity for
courts to impose their own discretionary interpretations of the
Convention, and thus alter the manner in which it is applied.
For example, the French Cour de Cassation held that a carrier
cannot be held liable under the second tier of liability if the
cause of the accident was unknown,100 like in the Air France
flight 447 crash. There, an Air France plane crashed into the
Atlantic Ocean while en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris on
May 31, 2009, and all passengers on board were killed.101 The
passengers’ heirs sought from the Toulouse Court of Appeal,
unsuccessfully, damages exceeding 100,000 SDR under the
Montreal Convention’s second tier of liability.102 The heirs chal-
lenged the appellate court’s decision on the grounds that they
were entitled to receive the damages unless the carrier could
prove an exonerating defense of either lack of negligence, the
presence of contributory negligence, or the existence of a third
party culprit.103 The carrier responded, and prevailed, that the
cause of the accident was under investigation and had not yet
been made known, and therefore, it should not be held liable
for damages exceeding 100,000 SDR104 because the second tier
98 Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26, Sched. II, s.1. “The liability shall be
enforceable for the benefit of such of the members of the passenger’s family as
sustained damage by reason of the death of the passenger. In this paragraph,
‘member of the passenger’s family’ means the passenger’s spouse or a person
who was cohabiting with the passenger in a conjugal relationship for a period of
at least one year immediately before the death of the passenger, a parent, step-
parent, grandparent, brother, sister, child, adopted child, stepchild, grandchild,
or any person for whom the passenger stood in the place of a parent.” Id.
99 Law no. 77 of 1943 (Egyptian Inheritance Code), al-Jarı¯dah al-Rasmı¯yah, 12
August 1943 (Egypt).
100 Cour de cassation, 1e´re civ., Apr. 2. Bulll Civ.1, No. 60.
101 M. X. et Autres v. Air France & AirBus, 11 Feb. 2015 Cour de Cassation (1er
Chambre Civile), 273 Revue Francaise De Droit Aerien et Sptial 87.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 88.
104 Id. at 90.
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of liability is based on presumed fault that does not operate
when the cause of the accident is unknown.105 Therefore, the
French courts will refuse to hold a carrier liable under the Mon-
treal Convention’s second tier of liability if the cause of the acci-
dent remains unknown. For another example, consider flight
MH-370, which vanished during its flight from Kuala Lumpur to
Beijing.106
The same problem has also occurred under the Warsaw Con-
vention. In Singapore and Hong Kong, courts held that the
term “carrier” under Articles 17, 18, and 19 does not include
agents and servants who could be held liable under the tradi-
tional common law rules, provided that the courts do not award
damages exceeding the limits under Article 22.107 Thus, those
courts allowed the servant and agents to be sued on other legal
grounds not related to the Warsaw Convention, defeating the
purpose of including them within the text of such Convention.
B. FORUM’S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
Using the forum’s choice-of-law rules to furnish the court with
rules to supplement the Montreal Convention is a better alterna-
tive than using the forum’s substantive law. However, this is not
a perfect solution—civil law jurisdictions will use its choice-of-
law rule for contracts in order to deal with the regulatory void,
while the common law jurisdictions will use its choice-of-law rule
for torts.108 This should not surprise anyone because the Mon-
treal Convention, like the Warsaw Convention, is applicable to
any action against a carrier, whether brought under contract law
or tort law.109 It remains to be seen which choice-of-law rules are
105 Id. at 91.
106 Lucy Marks, MH370: Search for Missing Flight Narrows to Specific Area Along the
‘Seventh Arc,’ ABC NEWS (July 5, 2017, 9:50 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/
2017-07-05/mh370-search-further-narrowed-to-fraction-of-seventh-arc/8678532
[https://perma.cc/YJA9-LBJ2].
107 Chan, supra note 8, at 341; Ericsson Ltd. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,
[2006] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 584, 599.
108 Micheal Bogdan, Aircraft Accidents in the Conflict of Law, 208 RECUEIL DES
COURS 142 (1988); Cachard, supra note 11, at 151; Singapore Annual Review 44
(Jack TEO Cheng Chuah ed., 2004).
109 Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art. 29.
Basis of claims. In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo,
any action for damages, however founded, whether under this Con-
vention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought
subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in
this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the
persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respec-
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capable of achieving predictability, legal certainty, and uniform-
ity of results.
1. Tort Choice-of-Law Rules
A survey of the common law forums will show there are sev-
eral choice-of-law rules for torts. First, there is the ancient En-
glish common law double-actionability choice-of-law rule, which
dictates that a foreign tort must be actionable under both the
forum’s law and lex loci delicti commissi. This rule is used by sev-
eral common law jurisdictions in Africa.110 Second, there is the
lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule, which is adopted by several other
common law jurisdictions (including several states in the United
States)111 because it is predictable, easy to use, and creates a
sense of legal certainty.112 However, this choice-of-law rule has
come under severe scrutiny by American scholars and courts be-
cause the place where the aerial accident occurred is often de-
scribed as “fortuitous.”113 As a result, courts in the United States
tend to substitute the lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule with a vari-
ety of modern choice-of-law doctrines. Some American courts
use choice-of-law doctrines such as the government interest
analysis114 and the comparative impairment doctrine developed
by the California Supreme Court.115 These are appealing be-
cause these are the choice-of-law rules prevailing in the state
where the court sits (since those courts believe that the claim in
question is not a federal question and the U.S. Supreme Court
did not mandate full preemption).116 On the other hand, some
tive rights. In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any other
non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.
Id.
110 RICHARD FRIMPONG OPPONG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMMON
WEALTH AFRICA 151 (2013); Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022.
111 James A. R. Nafziger, Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation
Rules and the Common Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 1001, 1009 (1994).
112 Antoni, supra note 89, at 6.
113 Joseph D. Tydings, Air Crash Litigation: A Judicial Problem and a Congressional
Solution, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 299, 300 (1969).
114 Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 582 (1974); Marcano Diaz v.
Easter Airlines, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 18, 21 (1988); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc.,
416 Pa. 1, 14 (1964); Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airlines, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 13 (2d
Cir. 1996).
115 Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do sul, 245 F. Supp. 819, 824 (1965).
116 This occurs because each state has the right to regulate the choice-of-law
issues as it pleases. The U.S. Supreme Court said,
Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal
courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which
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courts have used the Second Restatement as the federal com-
mon law choice-of-law rule because those courts believe that fill-
ing the gaps under the Warsaw Convention, as well as the
Montreal Convention, is a federal question that should not be
governed by state choice-of-law rules, since they are preempted
by the Warsaw Convention’s rules.117
The problem with the modern choice-of-law doctrines is that
they allow the courts to justify almost any result they want,118
which usually means that the court applies the forum’s law. For
example, in Brickner v. Gooden,119 an airplane registered in
Oklahoma crashed while en route from Oklahoma to Mexico.
The crash took place within Mexico, yet the court decided to
apply the law of Oklahoma, which was the forum’s law, because
Oklahoma had a greater interest in applying its law than Mex-
ico.120 The Court found that the point of departure was
Oklahoma, the plane was registered in Oklahoma, and most of
the victims were residents of Oklahoma.121
Even if the forum decided not to apply its own substantive law
to the facts of the case, the results under modern choice-of-law
doctrines remain unpredictable. In Pescatore v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc.,122 an airplane passenger, an Ohio resident, was
killed in Lockerbie, Scotland. The carrier was from New York.123
The court applied New York’s choice-of-law rules, the Neumeier
choice-of-law rule,124 to find that Scottish law would not apply to
the case because the place of the accident was fortuitous and
Scotland’s interests in the case was limited.125 The court then
leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the
right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors.
It is not for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by en-
forcing an independent “general law” of conflict of laws . . . to de-
termine whether a given matter is to be governed by the law of the
forum or some other law.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941). This is an
application of the Erie Doctrine. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75–76
(1938).
117 Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1987); Her-
nandez v. Aeronave de Mexico, S.A., 583 F. Supp. 331, 333 (Cir. D. Cal. 1984).
118 Willis L. M. Reese, The Law Governing Airplane Accidents, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1303, 1304 (1982).
119 525 P.2d 632 (1974).
120 Id. at 638.
121 Id.
122 97 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996).
123 Id. at 13.
124 Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y. 2d 121, 128 (1972).
125 Pescatore, 97 F.3d at 13.
2018] ARTICLE 5 OF THE ROME I REGULATION 105
decided that Ohio had a greater interest than New York because
Ohio had an interest in providing compensation for its re-
sidents, whereas the passenger had no contacts with New York
and New York’s interest in protecting corporations that operate
within its borders would not be affected because the Warsaw
Convention did not allow punitive damages.126 Had the plaintiff
been a foreigner and the carrier a New York resident, would the
court have applied New York law? Or would it instead apply the
foreigner’s law of domicile? Fortunately, the above choice-of-law
doctrines developed in the United States have not gained foot-
hold elsewhere.
2. Contracts Choice-of-Law Rule
In most civil law jurisdictions, the passenger’s action for dam-
ages under the contract of air carriage is brought under con-
tract law.127 This means that the universally accepted “party
autonomy” choice-of-law rule can be used to provide the legal
guidance to help fill both the definitional and regulatory voids
within the Montreal Convention.128 Thus, the parties can deter-
mine beforehand the rules that will govern their contracts,
achieving legal certainty and predictability, which cannot be
achieved under tort choice-of-law rules. However, there is one
main obstacle against this proposed solution, which is the adhe-
sive character of the standardized forms used in air transport.129
As in most consumer contracts, the carrier has a stronger bar-
gaining position than that of the passenger, and so, this ap-
proach would allow the carrier to choose a law favorable for his
interests as the law governing the contract of air transport.130 It
is even expected that carrier bargaining position will grow in
strength with the consolidation of the air carriers within a lim-
ited number of alliances.
126 Id. at 14.
127 Bogdan, supra note 108, at 142.
128 Egyptian Civil Code, art. 19. “Contractual Obligations are governed by the
law of the domicile when such domicile is common to the contracting parties,
and in the absence of a common domicile by the law of the place where the
contract was concluded. These provisions are applicable unless the parties agree,
or the circumstances indicate that it is intended to apply another law.” Id.; OP-
PONG, supra note 110, at 135; 2008 O.J. (L 177) Art. 5; Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971).
129 Bentivoglio, supra note 69, at 135.
130 Micheal Milde, Conflicts of Laws in the Law of the Air, 11 MCGILL L.J. 220, 244
(1965).
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Fortunately, there is a balanced and suitable choice-of-law
rule available:131 Article 5, Section 2 of the Rome I Regula-
tion.132 According to this article, the passenger and the carrier
can choose the law of one the following places to govern their
contract: (1) the place where the passenger’s habitual residence
exists; (2) the place where the carrier’s habitual residence exists;
(3) the place where the carrier’s place of central administration
is located; or (4) the place of departure or destination. It is im-
portant to note the parties’ freedom of choice is limited to
choosing the law of a single country that has a substantial con-
nection with the contract, which will allow the carrier to avoid
the difficulties of applying multiple laws to govern its liability
from a single incident. Once the parties choose a certain law,
then all claims brought against the carrier will be governed by
that law and that law only, with the exception of the Montreal
Convention. Here, the carrier cannot abuse its strong bargain-
ing power against the passenger to exert a favorable law because
the choices are predetermined, and Article 5 does not allow it to
unmoor the contract from state rules, i.e., contract sans lois.133
The balanced approach continues even when the parties fail
to choose a law to govern the contract of carriage. According to
Article 5, the court must apply the law of the place where the
passenger’s habitual residence exists if the point of departure or
destination is located in that country, or else, it must apply the
law of the place where the carrier has its habitual residence.
This means there is no absolute preference for the law of the
passenger’s habitual residence unless it has a significant contact
with the trip. This is in line with what several U.S. courts under
the modern choice-of-law doctrines have done, which is apply
the law of the passenger’s place of residence.134 Otherwise, the
focus will be on the carrier’s habitual residence, which is better
for the carrier’s interests given that fact that, in reality, passen-
gers usually do not share a common place of habitual resi-
131 M.C. Nita, Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 (Rome I) Special Rules to Determine
Applicable Law to International Carriage Contracts, 2015 CONF. INT’L DR. 261, 267
(2015).
132 O.J. (L 177) Art. 5.
133 For more analysis of contract sans lois concept, see Fre´de´rique Saboruin, Le
Contrat sans Loi en Droit International Prive´ Canadien,” 19 REV. QUE´BE´COISE DE
DROIT INT’L 35, 64 (2006).
134 Pearson v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 556 (2d Cir. 1962); Griffith v.
United Airlines Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 24–25 (1964); Allan I. Mendelsohn, A Conflict of
Laws Approach to the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 624, 627 (1967).
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dence.135 In fact, Article 5 of the Rome I Regulation is quite
similar to the choice-of-law rules proposed by several American
choice-of-law scholars.136 This makes it a suitable solution for
adoption in the United States, even if those courts decided to
treat choice-of-law issues related to air disasters as torts rather
than contractual breaches.
Nonetheless, there are still some challenges that might hinder
the use of the party autonomy choice-of-law rule to fill the voids
in the Montreal Convention. A court might resort to the public
policy defense if it finds the applicable law unacceptable from its
own point of view,137 or it may even simply apply its own law if
the parties fail to establish the contents of the chosen foreign
law because the court is not legally bound to take judicial notice
of foreign rules.138 On the other hand, this is a better approach
than allowing plaintiffs to dictate the use of the law of the forum
to fill the void in the Montreal Convention through selection of
the forum from among those listed in Article 33.139
135 Bentivoglio, supra note 69, at 138; Bogdan, supra 108, at 139; Andreas F.
Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REV. 497, 582 (1967).
136 Reese, supra note 118, at 1317; Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters & the
Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105, 122 (1989).
137 F. Mosconi, Exceptions To The Operation Of Choice Of Law Rules, 217 RECUEIL
DES COURS 80 (1989); Andreas Bucher, L’Ordre Public et Le But Social Des Lois En
Droit International Prive´, 239 RECUEIL DES COURS 25 (1993).
138 Ma .hkamat al-Naq .d [Court of Cassation], no. 149/57 (Egypt); Ma .hkamat al-
Naq .d [Court of Cassation], no. 408/21 (Egypt); Ma .hkamat al-Naq .d [Court of
Cassation], no. 51/36, session of 14 April 1970 (Egypt); Ma .hkamat al-Naq .d
[Court of Cassation], no. 8/35 (Egypt). For other jurisdictions, see TREATMENT
OF FOREIGN LAW - DYNAMIC TOWARDS CONVERGENCE (Yuko Nishitani ed., 2017).
139 Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art. 33.
1. An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the States Parties, either before
the court of the domicile of the carrier or of its principal place of
business, or where it has a place of business through which the con-
tract has been made or before the court at the place of destination.
2. In respect of damage resulting from the death or injury of a pas-
senger, an action may be brought before one of the courts men-
tioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, or in the territory of a State
Party in which at the time of the accident the passenger has his or
her principal and permanent residence and to or from which the
carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers by air, either
on its own aircraft or on another carrier’s aircraft pursuant to a
commercial agreement, and in which that carrier conducts its busi-
ness of carriage of passengers by air from premises leased or owned
by the carrier itself or by another carrier with which it has a com-
mercial agreement.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that the Montreal Convention
has two types of voids: the definitional void and the regulatory
void. As a result, courts have founds themselves forced to fill the
voids by either using the law of the forum or by resorting to the
forum’s choice-of-law rules. Using the laws of these many indi-
vidual forums means creating countless (and different) national
versions of the Montreal Convention. On the other hand, using
the forum’s choice-of-law rules means that holdings will depend
on the forum being a member of the civil law or the common
law system, which have different choice-of-law rules. Neither so-
lution will produce uniform results, and both will definitely lead
to too much variation in the rules used in supplementing the
Montreal Convention. This article suggests adopting Article 5 of
the Rome I Regulation as a choice-of-law rule that will help fill
the voids. This suggested route could easily be adopted by both
common law and civil law jurisdictions, allowing a much greater
degree of uniformity and predictability of results when each na-
tion’s courts apply the Montreal Convention.
